*Fresh interpretations of the greatest philosophers on the nature of truth and speculative essays on truth in law, the arts, and science*.

This paper explores Aristotle’s account of the human intellect, with special emphasis on how this account relates to Aristotle’s treatment of nature. In his complex account of the intellect, Aristotle distinguishes very broadly between two types of intellection. One type (nous) involves the reception of what things are and is non-discursive in character, while the other type (dianoia) is the result of intellectual activity and is discursive in character. While Aristotle affirms that both types of thinking are distinctive and essential (...) functions of the intellect, it is also clear that dianoia presupposes nous, insofar as dianoia assumes as given what nous has received. This paper also investigates Aristotle’s account of truth, arguing that the very principles of the intellect’s functioning are naturally given to the intellect. Given Aristotle’s account of the intellect as well as his account of truth and the principle of non-contradiction, one can see that, for Aristotle, nature has a primacy relative to the intellect. (shrink)

This paper describes a generative theory of bugs. It claims that all bugs of a procedural skill can be derived by a highly constrained form of problem solving acting on incomplete procedures. These procedures are characterized by formal deletion operations that model incomplete learning and forgetting. The problem solver and the deletion operator have been constrained to make it impossible to derive “star‐bugs”—algorithms that are so absurd that expert diagnosticians agree that the alogorithm will never be observed as a bug. (...) Hence, the theory not only generates the observed bugs, it fails to generate star‐bugs.The theory has been tested on an extensive data base of bugs for multidigit subtraction that was collected with the aid of the diagnostic systems buggy and debuggy. In addition to predicting bug occurrence, by adoption of additional hypotheses, the theory also makes predictions about the frequency and stability of bugs, as well as the occurrence of certain latencies in processing time during testing. Arguments are given that the theory can be applied to domains other than subtraction and that it can be extended to provide a theory of procedural learning that accounts for bug acquisition. Lastly, particular care has been taken to make the theory principled so that it can not be tailored to fit any possible data. (shrink)

Ackrill has written an enthusiastic and provocative introduction to Aristotle's philosophy of a type hitherto neglected. The book is neither a comprehensive presentation of Aristotle's thought nor a more limited sketch of its various parts through the perspective of some crucial Aristotelian insights. Its aim is to incite the reader to an independent reading of Aristotle by providing a philosophically stimulating guide to some of Aristotle's more persistently interesting ideas and arguments. No attempt is made to cover all the ground (...) of Aristotelian philosophy, but rather to discuss philosophical problems raised by Aristotle which Ackrill finds particularly piquant. Ackrill manages, nonetheless, to consider problems from most subdivisions of philosophical inquiry. The author denies that Aristotle's writings constitute a set of doctrines, and the entire book stands for the claim that Aristotle can be argued with "as if he were a contemporary". Thus Ackrill frequently criticizes the Aristotelian positions he reports, or mentions alternative views. Aristotle's antiquity is granted some advantage, however, for Ackrill finds Aristotle close enough to philosophy's beginnings to tackle philosophical problems in a brilliant way without an overly-technical language or method. (shrink)

The dominant unspoken philosophical basis of medical care in the United States is a form of Cartesian reductionism that views the body as a machine and medical professionals as technicians whose job is to repair that machine. The purpose of this paper is to advocate for an alternative philosophy of medicine based on the concept of healing relationships between clinicians and patients. This is accomplished first by exploring the ethical and philosophical work of Pellegrino and Thomasma and then by connecting (...) Martin Buber's philosophical work on the nature of relationships to an empirically derived model of the medical healing relationship. The Healing Relationship Model was developed by the authors through qualitative analysis of interviews of physicians and patients. Clinician-patient healing relationships are a special form of what Buber calls I-Thou relationships, characterized by dialog and mutuality, but a mutuality limited by the inherent asymmetry of the clinician-patient relationship. The Healing Relationship Model identifies three processes necessary for such relationships to develop and be sustained: Valuing, Appreciating Power and Abiding. We explore in detail how these processes, as well as other components of the model resonate with Buber's concepts of I-Thou and I-It relationships. The resulting combined conceptual model illuminates the wholeness underlying the dual roles of clinicians as healers and providers of technical biomedicine. On the basis of our analysis, we argue that health care should be focused on healing, with I-Thou relationships at its core. (shrink)

This collection consists of a two-part Introduction by the editors Martha Nussbaum and Amelie O. Rorty ; nineteen articles, mostly published here for the first time, by M. F. Burnyeat, Nussbaum and Hilary Putnam, S. Marc Cohen, Jennifer Whiting, Michael Frede, K. V. Wilkes, Alan Code and Julius Moravcsik, G. E. R. Lloyd, Charlotte Witt, Gareth B. Matthews, Richard Sorabji, Cynthia Freeland, Malcolm Schofield, Dorothea Frede, Julia Annas, Franz Brentano, L. A. Kosman, Charles Kahn, and Henry S. Richardson ; an (...) extremely useful Bibliography of works cited in these twenty chapters with important additions; an Index Locorum; and a Name Index. (shrink)

Bioactive peptides are a group of diverse intercellular signalling molecules. Almost half a century of research on this topic has resulted in an enormous amount of data. In this essay, a general perspective to interpret all these data will be given. In classical endocrinology, neuropeptides were thought of as simple signalling molecules that each elicit one response. However, the fact that the total bioactive peptide signal is far from simple puts this view under pressure. Cells and tissues express many different (...) bioactive peptides and they are also able to respond to many different bioactive peptides, indicating that multiple receptors and signal transduction pathways are present in a single cell. Therefore, the authors suggest that the bioactive peptide signalling system should be regarded in the context of network and systems biology. Bioactive peptides can best be viewed as an extension of the protein interaction network that allows regulating and fine‐tuning the metabolism of the different cells and tissues in the body. The cell thus responds to the ‘peptidome’ instead of to a single peptide. The intracellular part of this signalling network consists of the various signalling transduction cascades. Recently, new systems biology approaches have emerged for the modelling of cell signalling. The network and systems biology approach is also able to shed new light on the evolution of intercellular signalling. (shrink)

This paper, originating from a Wittgenstein conference in Delphi, Greece in June 2001, questions Brandom’s reading of Wittgenstein on “Following a Rule”. For the purpose of our current investigative dispute, it is a very good starting point to draw our attention to some of the vital differences between Wittgenstein’s and Brandom’s approach to the relation between practice and rules that may not be quite as clear at first sight from Brandom’s own writings. This writing maintains that Brandom misconstrues Wittgenstein’s remarks (...) about signposts and Philosophical Investigations §201 with the consequence that his own explications about tacit rules involved in practice seem more Wittgensteinian than they really are. For one, Brandom duplicates Wittgenstein’s requirement of correctness in rule following: “...correctness that consists in following a rule [does not presuppose] correctness that does not.” On the other hand Brandom’s reading makes Wittgenstein’s quietism look like ”a pretext for not doing constructive work”, while Wittgenstein’s point is that there is nothing left to enquire. (shrink)

This collection of essays by 13 well-known social scientists and commentators examines the modern state from different inter-disciplinary and thematic perspectives.

The central conflicts of the world today are closely related to cultural, traditional, and religious differences between nations. As we move to a globalized world, these differences often become magnified, entrenched, and the cause of bloody conflict. Growing out of a conference of distinguished scholars from the Middle East, Europe, and the United States, this volume is a singular contribution to mutual understanding and cooperative efforts on behalf of peace. The term paideia, drawn from Greek philosophy, has to do with (...) responsible education for citizenship as a necessary precondition for effective democracy. (shrink)

Kurt Sylvan's generous discussion of my book, The Domain of Reasons, argues that its account of reason relations would be strengthened if I accepted some version of ‘Kantian constructivism’, and that that would, moreover, bring me closer to Kant. I argue against both these claims. I do not agree that ‘Kantian constructivism’, understood in its contemporary sense, would strengthen my account of normativity. Nor do I agree that adopting it would make me more Kantian. On the contrary, I believe (...) that my cognitivist but irrealist account is closer to Kant than is anything that could be called ‘constructivism’ about reason. (shrink)

[ES] La teoría de modelos parte generalmente de la definición de consecuencia lógica ofrecida por Tarski en 1936. John Etchemendy asevera que esta definición contiene una falacia si se le toma como definición genuina de este concepto. Esta aseveración ha desatado una polémica interesante. El presente ensayo resume los puntos principales en discusión y sugiere en su conclusión que el rechazo de la propuesta de Etchemendy se basa en un malentendido de la intención de su crítica, cuyo objeto no (...) es, propiamente dicho, la definición de Tarski, sino que ésta ofrece un fundamento insuficiente para la teoría de modelos. [EN] Model Theory generally assumes the definition of logical consequence proffered by Tarski in 1936. John Etchemendy suggests that Tarski’s definition contains a fallacy, from which an interesting controversy ensued about the definition and its meaning. The main points in discussion are summarized and it is suggested that the controversy is based on a misunderstanding of the intentions of Etchemendy’s criticism: the target is not so much Tarski’s definition, but that it offers an insufficient foundation for Model Theory. (shrink)

Renowned philosopher Kurt Flasch offers a full-scale reappraisal of the life and legacy of Meister Eckhart, the medieval German theologian, philosopher, and alleged mystic who was active during the Avignon Papacy of the fourteenth century and was tried for heresy by Pope John XXII. Disputing his subject’s frequent characterization as a hero of a modern, syncretic spirituality, Flasch attempts to free Eckhart from the “Mystical Flood” by inviting his readers to think along with Eckhart in a careful rereading (...) of his Latin and German works. This fascinating study makes a powerful case for Eckhart’s position as an important philosopher of the time rather than a mystic and casts new light on an important figure of the Middle Ages whose ideas attracted considerable attention from such diverse modern thinkers as Schopenhauer, Vivekananda, Suzuki, Fromm, and Derrida. (shrink)

Kurt Gödel, mathematician and logician, was one of the most influential thinkers of the twentieth century. Gödel fled Nazi Germany, fearing for his Jewish wife and fed up with Nazi interference in the affairs of the mathematics institute at the University of Göttingen. In 1933 he settled at the Institute for Advanced Study in Princeton, where he joined the group of world-famous mathematicians who made up its original faculty. His 1940 book, better known by its short title, The Consistency (...) of the Continuum Hypothesis, is a classic of modern mathematics. The continuum hypothesis, introduced by mathematician George Cantor in 1877, states that there is no set of numbers between the integers and real numbers. It was later included as the first of mathematician David Hilbert's twenty-three unsolved math problems, famously delivered as a manifesto to the field of mathematics at the International Congress of Mathematicians in Paris in 1900. In The Consistency of the Continuum Hypothesis Gödel set forth his proof for this problem. In 1999, Time magazine ranked him higher than fellow scientists Edwin Hubble, Enrico Fermi, John Maynard Keynes, James Watson, Francis Crick, and Jonas Salk. He is most renowned for his proof in 1931 of the 'incompleteness theorem,' in which he demonstrated that there are problems that cannot be solved by any set of rules or procedures. His proof wrought fruitful havoc in mathematics, logic, and beyond. (shrink)

(1971). Values and the Future, the Impact of Technological Change on American Values Edited by Kurt Baier and Nicholas Rescher. World Futures: Vol. 10, No. 3-4, pp. 353-361.

History and Philosophy of Logic, Volume 0, Issue 0, Page 1-2, Ahead of Print.

In lieu of an abstract, here is a brief excerpt of the content:Journal of the History of Philosophy 42.1 (2004) 98-99 [Access article in PDF] Henrik Lagerlund and Mikko Yrjönsuuri, editors. Emotions and Choice from Boethius to Descartes. Dordrecht, Netherlands: Kluwer Academic Publishers, 2002. Pp. xi + 342. Paper $38.00. This book contains twelve essays that work together to trace a variety of theories of emotion, intellect, and will, specifically connected to the possibility of moral decision and action, that run (...) from the late ancient period to the early modern period. Though some essays are more history than philosophy, the collection nevertheless balances out and brings to the reader an in-depth study of what the editors rightly describe as a neglected field of research. Contributors are: Calvin Normore, Simo Knuuttila, Risto Saarinen, Mikko Yrjonsuuri, John Boler, Vesa Hirvonen, Henrik Lagerlund, Lorenzo Casini, Peter King, Deborah Brown, and Lilli Alanen.It is clear from the editors' introduction that the idea behind the collection is the piecing together of a complex patchwork of theories, showing how they form a single, coherent intellectual history from Boethius to Descartes. Time will tell whether the story told holds up. Several of the essays bring to light previously ignored philosophers of the medieval and scholastic periods who are seen as important players in the history being worked out. And, several essays (Brown's and Alanen's, e.g.) forward new and interesting—though arguably controversial—takes on philosophers well known to many (in their cases, Descartes). So, there is much worth looking at here.There are a few philosophical landmines. For example, in places authors seem unconcerned about potential problems arising from the way in which a view is stated. For instance, in explaining how a human being wills, the view that the willing is done via a faculty inherent in the soul is developed. This, of course, is all well and good. But, the author goes on to say, "If whatever the will wills is attained..." (18), which makes the will the subject of willing, not the human being. The will is also said to have passions, and the rational part of the soul an appetitive faculty (ibid.). So, is it that human beings do not will and do not have passions, but the wills will and have passions? Doesn't such a 'theory' simply push back what it is that needs to be explained? For, how does the will will? Does it have a faculty that wills, and so on? The trouble is that the reader is not sure whether the landmine is inherent in the view being discussed, an artifact of the text, or something invented by an author in the exegesis itself. [End Page 98]The river is high with respect to the readings. And so, it is not recommended to those coming, for example, to the topics of rational choice, free will, or weakness of will for the first time. However, it is highly recommended to those whose research deals with such topics, or is in the field of the history of philosophy of mind. Kurt Smith Bloomsburg University of Pennsylvania... (shrink)

Name der Zeitschrift: Klio Jahrgang: 99 Heft: 2 Seiten: 694-697.